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In an adversarial judicial system, a litigant's ability to access evidence
controlled by the opposing party is crucial for the system to function effectively.
Thus, "[d]iscovery is a fundamental cornerstone of the civil judicial process in
the United States."i The ever-expanding use of technology and the rise of

"B.A., University of Virginia, 2009: J.D.. Duke University School of Law, 2012. Law Clerk to
the Honorable Dennis W. Shedd. United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
1. Lauren R. Nichols. Note, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Litigator? The Varying Degrees of
Culpability Required for an Adverse Inference Sanction Regarding Spoliation of Electronic
Discovery, 99 KY. L.J. 881, 901 (2011) (citing JAMES N. DERTOUZOS ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR
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electronically stored information has drastically changed litigation, with
potential evidence now coming in many different forms, some of which can be
easily accessed and others of which cannot be so easily obtained. This change
has resulted in "[d]iscovery issues [becoming] more complex because of the
'significant differences between paper and electronic information in terms of
structure. content and volume."
At times, unfortunately, litigants violate the rules of discovery by destroying
evidence, thereby undermining the judicial system.4
This destruction of
evidence-known as spoliation-has become increasingly problematic as more
evidence is stored electronicallI.
Courts have many tools to combat spoliation,

CIVIL JUSTICE. TiHE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY: OPTIONS

FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 1 (2008). available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers!
OP183).
2.
See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake 1), 217 F.R.D. 309, 318 20 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (discussing the five most common categories of electronic data: active, online data; near-line
data; offline storage or archives; backup tapes; and erased, fragmented, or damaged data); see also
Salvatore Joseph Bauccio, Comment, E-Discovery: Why and How E-mail Is Changing the Way
Trials Are Won and Lost. 45 DuQ. L. REV. 269, 271 73 (2007) (discussing the storage of electronic
data and the difficulty in responding to discovery requests).
3. Nichols, supra note 1. at 898 (quoting THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA
PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC
DOCUMENT PRODUCTION, at iii (2005)).
In addition to increasing the complexity of discovery, electronic-discovery issues are far more
costly than traditional discovery issues, raising concerns that litigants are settling lawsuits "to avoid
the high costs," rather than 'on the merits of the case." Bauccio, supra note 2, at 271 (citing
ADVISORY COMM. ON THE FED. RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 109TH CONG., REPORT OF THE CIVIL
RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE 19 (2005)); see also Regan-Touhy v. Walgreen Co., 526 F.3d 641.,

649 (10th Cir. 2008) ("[T]he burdens and costs associated with electronic discovery. such as those
seeking 'all email.' are by now well known, and district courts are properly encouraged to weigh the
expected benefits and burdens posed by particular discovery requests (electronic and otherwise) to
ensure that collateral discovery disputes do not displace trial on the merits as the primary focus of
the parties' attention.").
4.
See, e.g., Mosaid Techs. Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co. (Mosaid II), 348 F. Supp. 2d 332,
335 (D.N.J. 2004) ("Sanctions are appropriate when there is evidence that a party's spoliation of
evidence threatens the integrity of this Court."): Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d
511. 515 (Cal. 1998) ("Destroying evidence can destroy fairness and justice, for it increases the risk
of an erroneous decision on the merits of the underlying cause of action. Destroying evidence can
also increase the costs of litigation as parties attempt to reconstruct the destroyed evidence or to
develop other evidence, which may be less accessible, less persuasive, or both.").
5.
See Dan H. Willoughby, Jr. et al., Sanctionsfor E-Discovery Violations: By the Numbers,
60 DUKE L.J. 789 790-91 (2010) ("Our analysis indicates that although the annual number of ediscovery sanction cases is generally increasing, there has been a significant increase in both
motions and awards since 2004. Motions for sanctions have been filed in all types of cases and all
types of courts. The sanctions imposed against parties in many cases are severe, including
dismissals, adverse jury instructions, and significant monetary awards."); see also Hon. David C.
Norton et al., Fifiv Shades of Sanctions: What Hath the Goldsnith'sApprentice Wf'rought?, 64 S.C.
L. REV. 459, 468 (2013) (discussing the frequency with which courts impose the adverse inference
instruction).
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ranging from the dismissal of a case and default judgment to fines.6 Among the
tools that judges may use to combat spoliation is the adverse inference
instruction. When a court employs this sanction, it instructs the jury that it may
infer from the destruction of evidence that the evidence was harmful to the
7
spoliator's case. The importance of the instruction is evident from the role it
can play in major litigation, including the recent patent dispute between
technology giants Apple and Samsung.
As discovery sanctions have become more common in the age of electronic
discovery, courts and scholars have begun to reevaluate the sanctions that courts
impose.9 One change that many courts and scholars have suggested for the
adverse inference instruction is lowering the level of mental culpability required
for courts to give the sanction. 10 Traditionally, the instruction was given only
when the spoliator acted in bad faith.
Since the 1990s, however, courts and
scholars have argued that negligence12 should suffice for a court to give the
instruction.13

6. See, e.g., Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 585 (4th Cir. 2001) (affirming the
dismissal of a case as a spoliation sanction); Mosaid Techs. Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co. (Mosaidl).
224 F.R.D. 595, 601 (D.N.J. 2004) (granting fees and costs as a spoliation sanction).
7.
See generallv 75A Am. JUR. 2D Trial 1102 (2007) (discussing the adverse inference
instruction).
8. See Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 881 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1151 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
(granting in part Apple's motion for an adverse inference jury instruction based on Samsung's
failure to preserve evidence); see also Jessica E. Vascellaro, Apple Wins Big in Patent Case: Jury
Finds Samsung llobile Devices Infringed Six Apple patents, Awards $1.05 Billion in Damages,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 2012, at Al (discussing a $1 billion verdict for Apple in its suit against
Samsung for patent infringement); Norton et al., supra note 5, at 481-85 (discussing the imposition
of an adverse inference instruction in the Apple litigation).
9. See, e.g., Maria Perez Crist, Preserving the Duty to Preserve: The Increasing
Iulnerability of Electronic Information, 58 S.C. L. REV. 7. 47-48 & n1.219 (2006) (noting that
"[c]ourts ... are divided as to the requisite level of [mental] culpability" for giving the instruction
and citing cases from various courts showing this division).
10. See, e.g., Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R.. 354 F.3d 739, 750 (8th Cir. 2004) (concluding
that, despite no finding of bad faith, sanctioning the ongoing destruction of records during litigation
and discovery through the imposition of an adverse inference instruction did not abuse trial courts
discretion).
11. See, e.g, The Pizarro, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat) 227, 240-41 (1817) (explaining that the
destruction of evidence "is not of itself a sufficient ground for [an adverse inference instruction]"
because the destruction may have occurred by "accident, necessity, or superior force," but that the
instruction is justified if there is "a vehement presumption of bad faith").
12. According to Black's Law Dictionary, spoliation is the "intentional destruction,
mutilation, alteration, or concealment of evidence." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1531 (9th ed.
2009) (emphasis added). This Article leaves aside the argument that courts may not give an adverse
inference instruction based on negligent spoliation because negligent spoliation does not exist.
Rather, this Article assumes, arguendo, that negligent spoliation does actually exist and explains
why courts should not give the instruction based on that level of mental culpability.
13. For courts that have adopted this position, see infra Part III.A.3. For an example of legal
scholarship that takes this position, see generally Matthew S. Makara. Note. ly Dog Ate My Email:
Creating a Comprehensive Adverse Inference Instruction Standardfor Spoliation of Electronic
Evidence, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 683, 686 (2009).
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This Article pushes back on this trend of allowing negligent spoliation to
warrant an adverse inference instruction. The temptation to believe that the party
who destroyed evidence should bear the risk of an adverse interference regarding
destroyed evidence is understandable,14 but this rationale ignores the connection
required for the jury to properly make the inference and takes a myopic view of
the instruction that disregards the instruction's three goals: to punish, deter, and
remedy.15 These three goals are best served when courts demand a showing of
bad faith in the destruction of evidence prior to giving the adverse inference
instruction. With the ever-increasing amount of litigation 6 and the rise of
electronic discovery violations, ensuring that courts and scholars have a proper
understanding of the adverse inference instruction is crucial if the instruction is
going to continue to play an effective role in punishing spoliators.
Part 11 of this Article begins with an introduction of the adverse inference
instruction, focusing on its purposes, its origin and history, and the test for
deciding whether to give the instruction. Part III discusses the circuit split that
has developed in federal courts over the level of mental culpability justifying the
instruction and gives examples of how courts have used the adverse inference
instruction in electronic discovery cases.
With this foundation laid, Part IV demonstrates the necessity of requiring
bad faith for a court to give the adverse inference instruction. It argues that, as a
logical matter, courts should never give an adverse inference instruction based
on a spoliator's negligence. It explains how a spoliator's bad faith provides the
critical connection to suggest that the destroyed evidence was harmful to the
spoliator's case. It then explains how negligent, as well as grossly negligent and
willful, destruction of evidence fails to provide this essential nexus.
Next, Part IV shows why not giving an adverse inference instruction based
on the spoliator's negligent destruction of evidence serves the instruction's three
purposes of punishment, deterrence, and remedy. It explains how the punitive
goal is best served by allowing the instruction to be given only when a spoliator
acts in bad faith because only such bad behavior deserves such a harsh
punishment. It next shows how the bad faith requirement deters spoliation
without sacrificing other important goals of litigation, goals that are not achieved
when courts give the instruction based on lesser levels of culpability. Finally,
Part IV demonstrates how giving the instruction for less than bad faith spoliation

14. See, e.g., Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir.
2002) ("The sanction of an adverse inference may be appropriate in some cases involving the
negligent destruction of evidence because each party should bear the risk of its ovii negligence.").
15. See infia Part IV.B.
16.

See, e.g., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.

COURTS.

2011 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE

DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF iTE UNITED STATES COURTS 10 (2011), available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2011/JudicialBusiness20ll.pdf
(providing
annual statistics of the caseload of federal courts).
17. See Willoughby et al., supra note 5. at 794 (noting the rise in sanctions in electronicdiscovery cases).
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does more than provide a remedy and instead gives the nonspoliating party an
unfair advantage. 8
11.

THE ADVERSE INFERENCE INSTRUCTION

This Part provides the necessary background on the adverse inference
instruction for fully engaging in the debates over the use of the instruction in
electronic discovery cases. It begins by defining the instruction. It then offers a
short historical overview of the instruction. It concludes by turning to the
variations of the test that courts apply for determining whether to give the
instruction.
A.

The Adverse Inference Instruction and Its Purposes

The adverse inference instruction is a jury instruction in which the judge
tells the jury that it may infer that destroyed evidence was harmful to the
spoliator's case.19 The instruction is based on "that favourite maxim of the law,
oinniapresumunturcontra oliatoren,"20 which translates to "[a]11 presumtions
are against [the spoliator]." 2 An adverse inference instruction can be as simple
as: "[Y]ou may, but are not required to, assume that the [destroyed evidence]
would have been adverse, or detrimental, to the [spoliator]."n

18. Although this Article focuses on why courts should not give an adverse inference
instruction based on anything other than bad faith, federal courts may not be able to give the
instruction based on anything other than bad faith, either under their inherent power or Rule 37 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. I will explore this potential restriction on federal courts in a
later article.
19. See United States v. Laurent. 607 F.3d 895. 902 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing SAND ET AL.,
MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL § 75.01 at 75-16 to -18 (2012) (instruction 75-7))
(noting that a spoliation instruction "is commonly appropriate ... where there is evidence from
which a reasonable jury might conclude that evidence favorable to one side was destroyed by the
other").
20. West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting SIR
THOMAS WILLES CHITTEY ET AL.. A SELECTION OF LEADING CASES ON VARIOUS BRANCHES OF

THE LAW 404 (13th ed. 1929) (internal quotation marks omitted)): see also Nichols, supra note 1. at
885 ("The adverse inference jury instruction is founded on the 'common sense' principle that a
party is more likely to destroy evidence that is harmful to his or her position than evidence that is
beneficial to his or her case." (quoting Nation-Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distribs.. Inc.. 692
F.2d 214, 218 (1st Cir. 1982))).
21. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1857 (9th ed. 2009).
22. Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R., 354 F.3d 739, 746 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting Transcript of
Trial at 1415-16, Stevenson, 354 F.3d 739 (No. 2:99CV00160WRW)).
An example of a longer instruction comes from fosaid H1:
You have heard that defendants failed to produce virtually all technical and other emails in this case. Plaintiff has argued that these e-mails were in defendants' control and
would have proven facts relevant to the issues in this case.
If you find that defendants could have produced these e-mails, and that the evidence
was within their control, and that the e-mails would have been relevant in deciding
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The instruction serves three purposes: to punish, deter, and remedy.2 First,
the punishment purpose is achieved by allowing the jury to decide that the
destroyed evidence was harmful to the spoliator, thus denying the spoliator the
benefit of the missing evidence for which the spoliator is responsible.24 Next,
the deterrence purpose is accomplished by servin2 as a warning of the
consequences if a party fails to preserve evidence.
Finally, the remedial
purpose is realized by giving the nonspoliating party the benefit of the evidence
that it could not present at trial. 26
B.

The Origins and History of the Instruction

Although electronic discovery is a relatively new legal area, the adverse
inference instruction is centuries old. The instruction is often traced to Armory
v. Delamirie,27 the famous 1722 English case. In that case, a chimney sweep's

disputed facts in this case, you are permitted, but not required, to infer that the evidence
would have been unfavorable to defendants.
In deciding whether to draw this inference you may consider whether these e-mails
would merely have duplicated other evidence already before you. You may also consider
whether you are satisfied that defendants' failure to produce this information was
reasonable. Again, any inference you decide to draw should be based on all the facts and
circumstances of this case.
348 F. Supp. 2d 332, 334 (D.N.J. 2004) (quoting MosaidI, 224 F.R.D. 595, 600 (D.N.J. 2004)).
23. Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing 1West, 167 F.3d
at 779); Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell. 243 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir. 2001); Beil v. Lakewood Eng'g &
Mfg. Co., 15 F.3d 546, 552-53 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d 1239, 1246
(6th Cir. 1988), overruled on othergrounds by Adkins v. Wolever, 554 F.3d 650 (6th Cir. 2009)).
24. See, e.g., Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(observing that the adverse inference instruction "serves as retribution against the immediate
wrongdoer").
25. See, e.g., Ogin v. Ahmed, 563 F. Supp. 2d 539, 546 (M.D. Pa. 2008) ("[A]n adverse
inference instruction is designed to deter similar conduct in future cases.").
26. See, e.g., Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that "an
adverse inference should serve the function, insofar as possible, of restoring the prejudiced party to
the same position he would have been in absent the wrongful destruction of evidence by the
opposing party").
27. (1722) 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B.); I Strange, 506.
28. For examples of cases citing Armory as the basis for the instruction, see Kronisch, 150
F.3d at 126 n.
Welsh, 844 F.2d at 1246: Nation-Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distribs.. Inc..
692 F.2d 214, 218 (1st Cir. 1982). For examples of scholars that trace the adverse inference
instruction to Armory, see MARGARET M. KOESEL & TRACEY L. TURNBULL, SPOLIATION OF
EVIDENCE: SANCTIONS AND REIEDIES FOR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL LITIGATION 62-

63 (Daniel F. Gourash ed., 2d ed. 2006); Paul Robert Eckert, Note, Utilizing the Doctrine of
Adverse Inferences When Foreign Illegality Prohibits Discovery: A ProposedAlternative, 37 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 749, 777 (1996); Sean R. Levine, Note, Spoliation of Evidence in Wfest Virginia:
Do Too Many Torts Spoliate the Broth?, 104 W.VA. L. REV. 419, 424 (2002): Makara, supra note
13, at 686 & n.28 (2009); Nichols, supra note 1, at 883 & n.23 ; Stefan Rubin, Note, Tort Reform: A
Callfor Florida to Scale Back Its hIdependent Tortfor the Spoliation of Evidence, 51 FLA. L. REV.
345, 347 (1999); Eric Marshall Wilson. Note, The Alabama Supreme Court Sidesteps a Definitive
Ruling in Christian v. Kenneth Chandler Construction Co.: Should AlabamaAdopt the Independent
Tort ofSpoliation?, 47 ALA. L. REV. 971. 973-74 (1996).
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boy took a jewel he found to a jeweler to determine its value, and when the boy
sued because the jeweler refused to give the jewel back, the judge instructed the
jury that it should presume that the jewel was of the "finest" quality, drawing the
inference against the goldsmith, based on the goldsmith's intentional decision
not to produce the jewel. 29
American courts adopted the instruction at an early stage. For example, the
0
Supreme Court recognized the validity of the instruction in The Pizarro.3
There, the Court reviewed prize proceedings after a ship was captured by
privateers and the owner sought return of the cargo. 3 Because the documents
identifying the ship and its contents had been destroyed, the privateers sought to
rely on an adverse inference instruction to prevent the owner from providing
"farther proof' of his ownership of the vessel.32 The owner objected to the
adverse inference, claiming that, because of a lack of bad faith in the spoliation
of the documents, he should be permitted to provide "farther proof' that he was,
in fact, the rightful owner of the ship. 33 Although the Court held that the
instruction was not warranted in this case, the Court clearly recognized the
validity of the instruction.
Today, the adverse inference instruction continues to be an important tool
for managing litigations. Federal courts give an adverse inference instruction
based on their inherent power or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b).3 In
state courts, however, the basis for giving the instruction is not always as clear.
For example, in South Carolina, courts most often appear to base the instruction
on the inherent power of courts to sanction litigants for misbehavior, but the
courts do not explicitly state the basis for giving the instruction.

Those scholars who do not trace the instruction to Arnory often go back a century turther to
Rex v. Arundel, (1617) 80 Eng. Rep. 258 (K.B.); Hobart, 109. Charles W. Adams, Spoliation of
Electronic Evidence: Sanctions Versus Advocacy, 18 MICH. TELECOMa. & TECH. L. REv. 1, 8
(2011); see also Cecilia Hallinan, Comment, Balancing the Scales After Evidence Is Spoiled: Does
Pennsylvania'sApproach Sufficiently Protect the Injured Party?, 44 VILL. L. REV. 947, 949 & ii.10
(1999) (tracing the history of courts addressing evidence destruction back to 1617); Lawrence
Solum & Stephen Marzen, Truth and bncertaintv: Legal Control of the Destruction of Evidence. 36
EMORY L.J. 1085, 1087 n4 (1987) (noting the history of evidence spoliation).
29. Armory, 93 Eng. Rep. at 664.
30. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 227 (1817): see also Sims v. Rockwell. 31 N.E. 484, 485 (Mass.
1892) (recognizing the validity of the adverse inference instruction); Pomeroy v. Benton, 77 Mo.
64, 85-86 (1882) (same).
31. The Pizarro, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) at 228.
32. Id. at 233 37.
33. Id. at 238.
34. See id. at 240-41.
35. See, e.g., Goodman v. Praxair Servs., Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d 494, 505-06 (D. Md. 2009)
(citing United Med. Supply Co. v. United States, 77 Fed. C1. 257, 263 264 (2007)) (identifying the
"inherent power to control the judicial process and litigation" and Rule 37 as sources of authority
for the court to issue spoliation sanctions).
36. In Gathers ex rel. Hutchinson v. S.C. Elec. & Gas Co., 311 S.C. 81, 83, 427 S.E.2d 687.
689 (Ct. App. 1993), the South Carolina Court of Appeals stated that "when a party loses or
destroys evidence, ain inference may be drawn that the destroyed or lost evidence would have been
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Testjbr Giving the Instruction

The most common test that courts apply in deciding whether to give an
adverse inference instruction requires the party seeking the instruction to prove
three elements.
First, the party who destroyed the evidence must have had a
duty to preserve that evidence at the time it was destroyed.
Second, the
evidence must have been relevant to the litigation.39 And third, the party must
have destroyed the evidence with a "culpable state of mind."4 0 Courts often cite
Byrnie v. Town of Cronwell"1 as the basis for this test.42 Judge Shira Scheindlin
discussed this test in more detail in Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC,43 which has
become a leading opinion on the instruction. 44 Now, many courts have generally
accepted this test as the means for determining whether to give the instruction.4
Not all courts, however, formulate the test the exact same way. The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, for instance, has
interpreted Fourth Circuit precedent as requiring "that the party knew the
evidence was relevant to some issue at trial and that his willful conduct resulted

adverse to that party," citing only Kershaw Cnty. Bd of Educ. v. US. Gypsum Co., 302 S.C. 390,
394, 396 S.E.2d 369, 372 (1990). Tracing back this line of cases leads to Welsh v. Gibbons, 211
S.C. 516, 518, 46 S.E.2d 147, 148 (1948), wvhich notes the "inherent power" that courts have to
enforce discovery.
Although South Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(A) mirrors its counterpart in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. South Carolina courts do not appear to use this rule as a basis for
giving the adverse inference instruction.
37. Beaven v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 622 F.3d 540, 553 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Residential
Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 2002)).
38. Id. (quoting ResidentialFunding, 306 F.3d at 107).
39. Id. (quoting ResidentialFunding, 306 F.3d at 107). This factor is listed third in the Sixth
Circuit's opinion, but it is listed second here so that the focus is on the third and final factorwhether the evidence was "destroyed with a culpable state of mind," id (internal quotation marks
omitted) because that is the key factor in this Article.
40. Id. (quoting Residena1
Funding, 306 F.3d at 107) (internal quotation marks omitted).
41. 243 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2001).
42. E.g., Toth v. Calcasieu Parish, No. 06-998, 2009 WL 528245, at *1 n.2 (W.D. La. Mar. 2.
2009); Dupee v. Klaff's. Inc.. 462 F. Supp. 2d 244. 248 (D. Conn- 2006); Hamilton v. Signature
Flight Support Corp., No. C 05-0490 CW (MEJ), 2005 WL 3481423, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20,
2005).
43. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake II). 220 F.R.D. 212, 216-21 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
44. See, e.g., Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Alcoa, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 335, 339 (M.D. La. 2006)
(noting that the Zubiulake cases have "been recognized as setting the benchmark standards for
modern discovery and evidence-preservation issues"); Thompson v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban
Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 100-01 (D. Md. 2003) (applying the Zubulake analysis in case involving the
destruction of electronic records).
45. E.g., Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372. 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Residential
Funding, 306 F.3d at 107); Victor Stanley. Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 520-21 (D.
Md. 2010) (quoting Goodman v. Praxair Servs.. 632 F. Supp. 2d 494, 509 (D. Md. 2009)): Rimkus
Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 615-16 (S.D. Tex. 2010); Nursing Home
Pension Fund v. Oracle Corp., 254 F.R.D. 559, 564 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (quoting In re Napster, Inc.
Copyright Litig., 462 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2006)); Sampson v. City of Cambridge.
251 F.R.D. 172, 179 (D. Md. 2008) (quoting Thompson, 219 F.R.D. at 101).
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in its loss or destruction" for the instruction to be given.4 6 Another example of a
different formulation is the Third Circuit's test, which focuses on the "degree of
fault" by the spoliator, the "prejudice suffered by the opposing party," and
whether a lesser sanction could "avoid substantial unfairness" to the
nonspoliating party while deterring future spoliation.47 Despite these different
articulations of the test, all of the tests focus on the same factors: whether the
spoliator had a duty to preserve the evidence; whether the evidence was relevant;
and whether the spoliator had a sufficient mental culpability.
D. The Adverse Inference Instruction in ElectronicDiscovery Cases
The adverse inference instruction is now a common tool in electronic
discovery cases. One study has shown that prior to January 1, 2010, fifty-two
electronic discovery cases in federal courts involved the adverse inference
instruction.48 This shows how litigants regularly move for courts to impose this
sanction when evidence is destroyed and courts engage in lengthy analysis to
determine whether the sanction is appropriate. 49 A repeated context-perhaps
the most common context-in which the instruction arises, including in cases
such as Treppel v. Biovail Corp., Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc.,
and Philips Electronics North America Corp. v. BC Technical,52 is deleted
backup tapes that resulted in lost evidence that would likely have been critical to
the outcome of the case.
Ultimately, the vast quantity of electronically stored
information creates more material potentially subject to discovery, thereby
creating more opportunities for parties to violate discovery rules and leading to
more instances in which courts can impose sanctions, including the adverse

46. Powell v. Town of Sharpsburg, 591 F. Supp. 2d 814. 817 (E.D.N.C. 2008) (quoting
Buckley v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 306. 323 (4th Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
47. Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 79 (3d Cir. 1994).
48. See Willoughby et al., supra note 5, at 811-14 (collecting cases).
I have not undertaken a similar study to collect cases from the past three years to see how
many more cases can be added to these fifty-two cases from prior to 2010. A cursory search on
Westlaw for electronic-discovery cases involving the adverse inference instruction overwhelmingly
suggests that the instruction continues to play an important role in these cases.
49. See, e.g., Scalera v. Electrograph Sys., Inc.. 262 F.R.D. 162. 179 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)
(denying the motion for an adverse inference instruction because the moving party could not prove
that the destroyed evidence was relevant to the case); Ferron v. Echostar Satellite, LLC, 658 F.
Supp. 2d 859, 864 (S.D. Ohio 2009) (denying the motion for the adverse inference instruction
because the moving party could not establish that the evidence was destroyed in bad faith).
50. 249 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
51. 269 F.R.D. 497 (D. Md. 2010).
52. 773 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (D. Utah 2011).
53. See, e.g., Phihps Elecs., 773 F. Supp. 2d at 1204 (noting the defendants failure to
twenty months while [the] lawsuit was pending"); Victor
preserve backup tapes "during the first
Stanley, 269 F.R.D. at 531 (finding bad faith spoliation when defendant "deleted thousands of files
and ran programs to ensure their permanent loss immediately following preservation requests and
orders, and immediately before scheduled discovery efforts"); Treppel, 249 F.R.D. at 119
(expressing concern over the failure to preserve backup tapes after litigation had commenced).
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inference instruction. The instruction is therefore even more relevant to
litigation now than it was in the predigital era.
111. THE CRITICAL ISSUE WITH THE ADVERSE INFERENCE INSTRUCTION: MENTAL

CULPABILITY
The basic background information about the adverse inference instruction in
Part 11 is relatively uncontroversial. One aspect of the instruction, however, is
the subject of intense debate among scholars and courts: the level of mental
culpability required to justify the use of the instruction. This Part sets forth the
split that has developed among federal circuit courts, highlights the most
prominent example of this debate, and provides examples of these varying
mental-culpability standards applied in electronic discovery cases.
A.

The Circuit Split over the Alental-Culpability Requirement

For many years, the adverse inference instruction was premised on a
spoliator's bad faith destruction of evidence . Since the 1990s, however, some
courts have lowered the required culpability and allowed negligent spoliation to
provide a basis for giving the instruction . This growing trend has created a
split among the circuits-a division recognized by both courts and scholars.
This Section highlights this circuit split.
1.

CircuitsRequiring Bad Faith

The Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits all require that a
spoliator act with bad faith for a court to give an adverse inference instruction.
The Fifth Circuit requires "bad conduct" to support an adverse inference
instruction and has explicitly held that "[m]ere negligence is not enough" to
warrant the instruction.
In a more recent case, that circuit articulated the

54. See supra notes 27 34 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir.
2002) ("The sanction of an adverse inference may be appropriate in some cases involving the
negligent destruction of evidence.
."); Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell, 243 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir.
200 1) (acknowledging that "bad faith-an intent to obstruct the opposing party's case need not be
shown to justify an inference of spoliation" and that intentional destruction is sufficient to justify an
inference of spoliation); Reilly v. Natwest Mkts. Grp. Inc., 181 F.3d 253, 268 (2d Cir. 1999)
(holding that "a finding of bad faith or intentional misconduct is not a sine qua non to sanctioning a
spoliator with an adverse inference instruction").
56. See, e.g., United States v. Laurent. 607 F.3d 895. 902 & n1.5 (1st Cir. 2010) (noting that
"the case law is not uniform in the [mental] culpability needed for the instruction" and collecting
cases to illustrate the division among the courts).
57. See, e.g., Crist, supra note 9, at 47-48 & n.219 (noting that "c]ourts ... are divided as to
the requisite level of [mental] culpability" for giving the instruction and collecting cases to illustrate
this division).

58. Vick y. 'Tex. Emp't Commn'n, 514 F.2d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1975) (citations omitted).
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standard as "bad faith." 59 Thus. when a defendant in a sex-discrimination case
"destroyed [records] inder routine procedures without bad faith and well in
advance" of litigation, an adverse inference instruction was not warranted .60
The Seventh Circuit likewise mandates that a spoliator act with "bad faith"
for a court to give an adverse inference instruction.6
In Park v. City of
Chicago,6 the court noted that "[the crucial element is not that e lience was
destroyed but rather the reason for the destruction."'
For example, Vhen a
formier emaployee sued her emrployer for discrimination and the employer could
not find the documents, an adverse inference instruction wras rot appropriate
because all the formcr employce could prove was that the em ployer "lost these
documents, nlot that the employer destroyed thcm in bad faith
The Eighith Circuit "requires 'a finding of intentional destruction indicating a
desire to suppress the truth"' for a court to give an adverse inference
instruction.65 Although the court stated in one case that bad faith was not
necessary for the instruction to be given,6 the court expressly relied on the
district court's finding that the spoliator acted in bad faith to uphold the
instruction in that case. 6 Several years later, the Eighth Circuit removed any
uncertainty, holding that "a finding of bad faith is necessary before giving an
adverse inference instruction at trial." 68
The Tenth Circuit also demands that a spoliator act with "bad faith" before a
court gives an adverse inference instruction.69 Based on this rule, the court
affirmed a district court's refusal to give an adverse inference instruction when a

59. Condrey v. SunTrust Bank of Ga., 431 F.3d 191, 203 (5th Cir. 2005) ("The Fifth Circuit
permits an adverse inference against the destroyer of evidence only upon a showing of 'bad faith' or
'bad conduct.'" (quoting King v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 337 F.3d 550. 556 (5th Cir. 2003))).
60. Vick, 514 F.2d at 737 (emphasis added).
61. See, e.g., Faas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 532 F.3d 633, 644 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that
to give an adverse inference instruction, a court must find that the spoliator "intentionally destroyed
the documents in bad faith"); S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.. 695 F.2d
253, 258 (7th Cir. 1982) (explaining that the adverse inference instniction is permissible only when
a court finds that evidence was destroyed in bad faith).
62. 297 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2002).
63. Id. at 615 (alteration in original) (quoting S.C. Johnson, 695 F.2d at 258) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
64. Id. at 616-17.
65. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Wade, 485 F.3d 1032, 1035 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Stevenson
v. Union Pac. R.R., 354 F.3d 739, 746 (8th Cir. 2004)).
66. Stevenson. 354 F.3d at 750 ("Sanctioning the ongoing destruction of records during
litigation and discovery by imposing an adverse inference instruction is supported by either the
court's inherent power or Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, even absent an explicit
bad faith finding ... .").
67. See id. at 747-48. The court did acknowledge that this case "test[ed] the limits of what
[the court was] able to uphold as a bad faith determination." Id.
68. Menz v. New Holland N. Am., Inc., 440 F.3d 1002. 1006 (8th Cir. 2006).
69. Turner v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 563 F.3d 1136, 1149 (10th Cir. 2009) ("[I]f the
aggrieved party seeks an adverse inference to remedy the spoliation, it must also prove bad faith.");
see also Aranburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1407 (10th Cir. 1997) ("The adverse inference
must be predicated on the bad faith of the party destroying the records.").

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

11

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 7
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

692

[VOL. 64: 681

spoliator in a wrongful death case destroyed records with only "mere
negligence." 70
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit insists that a spoliator act with "bad faith" for a
court to give an adverse inference instruction. Because the circuit requires bad
faith, it upheld a district court's decision in a wrongful death case not to give an
adverse inference instruction because "no probative evidence indicates that the
spoliator] purposely lost or destroyed the relevant [evidence].'"
2.

CircuitsRequiring Less than Bad Faith but More than Negligence

Two circuits-the Third and Fourth-fall between those circuits that require
bad faith and those that require only negligence.
The Third Circuit requires that evidence be "destroyed intentionally" for a
court to give the adverse inference instruction, demanding more than negligence
but less than bad faith.
Applying this rule in a products liability case, the
circuit court held that the district court was correct in refusing to give the adverse
inference instruction because the party seeking the instruction had failed to
satisfy its burden of showing that the evidence was "willfully" destroyed.
Like the Third Circuit, the Fourth Circuit does not require bad faith but has
explicitly rejected negligent destruction as sufficient to support the adverse
inference instruction, instead holding that "willful conduct" is required.
This
standard was called into question in Silvestri v. General Motors Corp. 6 when the
court upheld the dismissal of the plaintiff s case-a more severe sanction than an
adverse inference instruction-based on conduct by the plaintiff's attorney that
was "at least negligent and may have been deliberate."7 The Fourth Circuit

70. Henning v. Union Pac. R.R., 530 F.3d 1206. 1220 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Aranburu,
112 F.3d at 1407) (internal quotation marks omitted).
71. Mann v. Taser Inl, Inc.. 588 F.3d 129 1 1310 (11th Cir. 2009) ("In the Eleventh Circuit,
'an adverse inference is drawn from a party's failure to preserve evidence only when the absence of
that evidence is predicated on bad faith."' (quoting Bashir v. Amtrak. 119 F.3d 929, 931 (11th Cir.
1997))).
Although the D.C. Circuit has never explicitly defined the level of mental culpability required
for a court to give an adverse inference instruction, it appears to fall on this end ofthe spectrum as
well. See Wyler v. Korean Air Lines Co.. 928 F.2d 1167, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that
"mere innuendo" is not enough to justify the instruction); see also Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v.
Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 614 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (including the D.C. Circuit in the list of
circuits requiring bad faith for a court to give an adverse inference instruction).
72. Bashir, 119 F.3d at 931.
73. See Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 334 (3d Cir. 1995).
74. Gurnbs v. Int'1 Harvester, Inc.. 718 F.2d 88, 96-97 (3d Cir. 1983).
75. Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 156 (4th Cir. 1995) ("While a finding of
bad faith suffices to permit such an inference, it is not always necessary.").
76. 271 F.3d 583 (4th Cir. 2001).
77. See id. at 593 94.
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ultimately clarified its position in a later case, holding that "intentional, willful.
or deliberate" conduct can support an adverse inference instruction.
This middle-of-the-road standard from the Third and Fourth Circuits may
not seem that different from the bad faith requirement of many other circuits, but
it does miss a critical component of that requirement: it does not require that
crucial element of why the evidence was destroyed.79 That said, at least this
standard is closer to the bad faith standard than the negligence standard, which
the next Section discusses.
3.

CircuitsRequiring Only Nkegligence

The Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have adopted the current trend of
allowing negligent destruction of evidence to support an adverse inference
instruction.
The Second Circuit led the initial charge in allowing negligence to support
an adverse inference instruction. After some debate over the mental-culpability
requirementso that court ultimately held in Residential Funding Corp. v.

78. Buckley v. Mukasy, 538 F.3d 306, 323 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Kenneth J. Withers, Risk Aversion, Risk Management, and the
"Overpreservation" Problem in Electronic Discovery, 64 S.C. L. REv. 537. 557 (2013) (treating
Buckley as imposing a requirement that a spoliator's action be at least "willful" for a court to give
ain adverse inference instruction and placing this requirement "along a continuum" between bad
faith and negligence).
Judge Norton, Woodard, and Cleveland assert that negligence is enough in the Fourth Circuit
to impose an adverse inference instruction. See Norton et al., supra note 5, at 465 & n1.41.
Although the cases cited in that footnote do state that negligent spoliation can warrant ain adverse
inference instruction, those cases are not controlling or persuasive. By tracing back the citations in
each case, the end result is a citation to the Second Circuit's decision in Residential Funding Corp.
v. DeGeorge Financial Corp., 306 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2002). See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.
v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 803 F. Supp. 2d 469, 498 (E.D. Va. 2011) (citing Victor Stanley, Inc. v.
Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 529 (D. Md. 2010) (citing Goodman v. Praxair Servs., Inc., 632
F. Supp. 2d 494, 518 (D. Md. 2009) (citing Thompson v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219
F.R.D. 93, 101 (D. Md. 2003) (citing Residential Funding, 306 F.3d at 107)))). The Second
Circuit's standard is not the same as the Fourth Circuit's standard, as clarified in Buckley, 583 F.3d
at 323. Thus, these district court cases incorrectly state the law in the Fourth Circuit.
79. As explained in more detail in Part IV.A, to properly infer that destroyed evidence was
unfavorable to the spoliator, the jury must know the reason that evidence was destroyed. See, e.g.,
S.C. Johnson & Son. Inc. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 695 F.2d 253, 258 (7th Cir. 1982) ("The
crucial element is not that the evidence was destroyed but rather the reason for the destruction."
(emphasis added)).
80. In Reilly v. Natiest Markets Group Inc., 181 F.3d 253 (2d Cir. 1999), the Second Circuit
parsed its previous decisions and noted that it had never before determined the mental culpability
required for a district court to give an adverse inference instruction. Id. at 267. The court explained
that its holding in Berkovich v. Hicks, 922 F.2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1991), that the absence of bad faith
precluded the instruction, was decided only on "the facts of [that] case," and thus did not announce
a per se rule. Reilly, 181 F.3d at 267 (quoting Berkovich, 922 F.2d at 1024) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The court went on to hold that gross negligence was sufficient mental culpability
to support an adverse inference instruction because the court had "previously approved more severe
sanctions based solely on gross negligence." Id. Two years later, in Byrnie v. Town ofJ(-omwniell,
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DeGeorge Financial Co. that any level of culpability from "negligence to
intentionality" could warrant an adverse inference instruction. 82 In adopting this
position, the Second Circuit cited Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc, a 1991
decision from the Southern District of New York, in which the district court
reasoned that the instruction "should be available even for the negligent
destruction of documents if that is necessary to further the remedial purpose of
the inference." 1
The Sixth Circuit cited Residential Funding Corp. as support for its decision
to allow negligence to support an adverse inference instruction.8 Like the
Second Circuit, the Sixth Circuit noted the range of mental culpability that will
permit a district court to give an adverse inference instruction: "[T]he culpable
state of mind factor is satisfied by a showing that the evidence was destroyed
knowingly, even if without intent to [breach a duty to preserve it], or
negligently."86 The Sixth Circuit never analyzed what the proper mentalculpability requirement should be, but instead merely cited Residential Funding
Corp. The court applied that standard to a case involving the Federal Tort
Claims Act,8 upholding the district court's decision to give the instruction
because the folder with relevant evidence was destroyed after the defendant
knew of the litigation and that the folder was a critical part of the case. 8
Although the Ninth Circuit has not been clear about the mental-culpability
requirement, 89 the best reading of its cases shows that negligence can support an

243 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2001). the court again stated that "[t]he law in this circuit is not clear on wvhat

state of mind a party must have when destroying it." Id. at 107-08. In that case, the court upheld
the adverse inference instruction because the records were destroyed in violation of federal
regulations, without ever determining the state of mind with which the documents were destroyed.
Id. at 108. Later in Bvrnie, the court seems to suggest that even mere negligence may be enough to
support the instruction. See id. at 109 ("The party must demonstrate first that the records were
destroyed with a culpable state of mind (i.e., where, for example, the records were destroyed
knowingly. even if without intent to violate the regulation, or negligently).").
81. 306 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2002).
82. Id. at 108 (quoting Reilly, 181 F.3d at 267) (internal quotation marks omitted).
83. 142 F.R.D. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
84. Id. at 75.
85. See Beaven v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 622 F.3d 540. 554 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Residential
Funding,306 F.3d at 108).
86. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Residential Funding, 306 F.3d at 99) (emphasis
added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
87. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (2006).
88. See Beaven, 622 F.3d at 553-54.
89. 1 argue here that the Ninth Circuit's cases support a conclusion that it permits negligent
spoliation to warrant an adverse inference instruction. I readily acknowledge, however, that the
Ninth Circuit has never expressly held this. At the very least, the Ninth Circuit belongs in the
middle category with the Third and Fourth Circuits.
See Glover v. BIC Corp., 6 F.3d 1318, 1329 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v.
Lakewood Eng'g & Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d 363. 368-70 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1992)) (noting that a finding
of bad faith is not required to support the adverse inference instruction); see also United States v.
Romo-Chavez, 681 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 2012) (recognizing that although an adverse inference
instruction in criminal cases requires bad faith spoliation, the "standard in civil cases differs
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adverse inference instruction. In Glover v. BIC Corp.,90 the court held that "bad
faitl is only one avenue to the presumption, but not the only one.
In Glover,
the court remanded the case for a new trial and instructed the district court to
make sure that an adverse inference instruction did not imply that bad faith was
required.92 Almost a decade later, in Medical Laboratory Management
Consultants v. American BroadcastingCos.,93 the Ninth Circuit again addressed
the adverse inference instruction. As in Glover, the court in Medical Laboratory
never expressly stated that negligence was sufficient for a district court to give
an adverse inference instruction, but that is the implication of the court's
decision in this later case.94 The court wrote, " When relev ant e-vidence is lost
accidentally or for an innocent reason, an adverse evidentiary inference from the
loss Imay be rejected."
If evidence lost accidentally-that is, nogligently U

was never enough to permit a court to give an adverse inference instruction, the
Ninth Ciicuit

ould have held that in such circumstances, the instruction must be

rejected. But the Ninth Circuit did not do so. Instcad, it discussed how the
district court did not ah se its discretion in refusing to giv e an adv,erse inference
instruction because the evidence was lost accidentally and other evidence could

be offered on the saImC point ' qy undcrtai. this discussion, the appellate
court irplied that in some situations, a district court could give an adverse
inference ins;truction hased ol the negligeni or accidental loss of evidence
withlout abusing its discretion. Furtber supporting the conclusion that negligent
spoliation is sufficient for a court to give an alverse inference instruction in the
Ninth Circuit is the fact that many district courts cite negligence as the standard
and the Ninth Circuit does not appear to have reversed any of thcsc decisions.

somewhat"). Still, as this paragraph hopefully argues persuasively, the Ninth Circuit has gone
further than the Third and Fourth Circuits in lowering the mental culpability required for a court to
give the adverse inference instruction.
90. 6 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1993).
91. Id at 1330.
92. Id
93. 306 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2002).
94. See id. at 824-25.
95. Id at 824 (emphasis added).
96. In describing the facts of the case, the court stated that the evidence was destroyed "at
most with negligence." Id at 824. The court thus appeared to treat "accidentally" losing evidence
the same as "negligently" losing evidence in its discussion of whether the district court abused its
discretion by not giving the instruction. See id. at 824 25.

97. Id.
98. See, e.g., FTC v. Lights of Am. Inc., No. SACV 10 1333 JVS (MLGx), 2012 WL
695008, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2012) ("The 'culpable state of mind' includes negligence."
(quoting Lewis v. Ryan, 261 F.R.D. 513, 521 (S.D. Cal. 2009))); Uribe v. McKesson, No. 1:08 cy
01285 DMS (NLS), 2010 WL 4235863, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2010) ("The 'culpable state of
mind' includes negligence." (quoting Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d
99, 108 (2d Cir. 2002))); Lewis, 261 F.R.D. at 521 ("The 'culpable state of mind' includes
negligence." (quoting Residential Funding, 306 F.3d at 108)); Washington Alder LLC v.
Weyerhaeuser Co., No. CV 03 753 PA, 2004 WL 4076674, at *1 (D. Or. May 5. 2004) (citing
Residential Funding, 306 F.3d at 108) (recognizing the allowance of sanctions for acts that were
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The position adopted by these circuits has support from recent scholarship.
For example, Matthew Makara argues that negligence is "more appropriate" than
the stricter standard of bad faith.99 Ben Farrell similarly claims that "the
appropriate level of culpability for an adverse inference instruction should be
negligence," based on the deterrent effect and the need for providing a remedy
for the innocent party 100 Jonathan Judge agrees that the adverse inference
instruction should be' warranted in cases of negligent spoliation. 10o Lauren
Nichols supports gross negligence as a standard in electronic discovery cases to
"reduce the excessive costs and burdens" of discovery in these cases.' 0 2 Drew
Dropkin offers a new framework based on the relative culpability and
circumstantial evidence, in which no minimum culpability level exists if enough
circumstantial evidence exists.10 3

done negligently). Other district courts, however, require at least gross negligence. See, e.g.,
Chavez v. Blue Sky Natural Beverage Co., No. 06 06609 JSW (JSC), 2011 WL 4830997. at *3
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2011) (recognizing appropriateness of sanctions for "bad faith or gross
negligence" (quoting Karnazes v. County of San Mateo, No. C 09 0767 MMC (MEJ), 2010 WL
2672003, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 2. 2010))): Hester v. Vision Airlines, Inc., No. 2:09 cy 00117 RLH
RUJ, 2010 WL 4553449, at *6 (D. Nev. Nov. 3. 2010) (citing Karnazes, 2010 WL 2672003, at *2)
(recognizing appropriateness of sanctions for bad faith or gross negligence).
This conflict
underscores the lack of clarity in the Ninth Circuit over the mental-culpability requirement for the
adverse inference instruction.
Notably, the First Circuit appears never to have taken a position on the mental culpability
required to give ain adverse inference instruction. In Nation-4Wide Check Corp., Ic. v. Forest Hills
Distributors,Inc., 692 F.2d 214 (1st Cir. 1982). the court never evaluated the spoliator's mental
culpability in determining whether the instruction was appropriate. Id. at 217-20. In no case since
that decision has the First Circuit jumped into this fray over the mental culpability required for a
court to give an adverse inference instruction. The court has merely said that the finder of fact "is
free to reject the inference" if it believes evidence was "destroyed accidentally or for an innocent
reason." Blinzler v. Marriott Int'l. Inc., 81 F.3d 1148. 1159 (1st Cir. 1996); see also Testa v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 173, 177 (1st Cir. 1998) (setting the test for giving ain adverse inference
instruction without referring to the spoliator's mental culpability). This suggests that negligence
may justify giving an instruction (for the jury to reject the inference, then the judge must have given
it), but the First Circuit has never made such an unequivocal statement. In fact, most recently, the
First Circuit has said that "the instruction usually makes sense only where the evidence permits a
finding of bad faith destruction." United States v. Laurent, 607 F.3d 895, 902 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing
SAND ET AL.. MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL § 75.01 at 75-17 (2010) (instruction
75-7)). Yet the First Circuit explicitly declined to answer finally the question of mental culpability
because doing so was not necessary to resolve the case. See id. at 902 03.
99. Makara, supra note 13, at 708 (noting that "the approach of the negligence jurisdiction is
more appropriate than the willfulness doctrine").
100. Ben Farrell, Note, Spoliation in a Digital fWorld Proposing a New Standard of
Culpability in Massachusettsfor an Adverse Inference Instruction, 14 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP.
ADVOC. 110, 123 (2009).
101. Jonathan Judge, Comment, Reconsidering Spoliation: Common-Sense Alternatives to the
Spoliation Tort, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 441, 463-64 (suggesting that "because the inference is primarily
concerned with the restoration of accuracy," it should be extended to negligent spoliation).
102. Nichols, supra note 1. at 883.
103. Drew D. Dropkin, Note, Linking the Culpability and Circumstantial Evidence
Requirementsfor the Spoliation Interence, 51 DUKE L.J. 1803, 1827-28 (2002).
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B. Examples of the Instructionin Electronic Discovery Cases
With the split among the federal circuit courts offering an example of the
debate over the mental-culpability requirement, this Section turns to examples of
cases in which courts have given the adverse inference instruction based on the
destruction of electronically stored information. This Section highlights two
cases involving the various mental-culpability requirements discussed in Part
III.A. These cases will provide useful examples in the discussion in Part IV
about what the required level of mental culpability should be.
The first example is Nucor Corp. v. Bell,104 in which Nucor Corp. (Nucor)
sued John Bell, a former employee, and SeverCorr, LLC (SeverCorr), Bell's new
employer, alleging that Bell took trade secrets from Nucor to his new job at
SeverCorr. os During the course of litigation, Nucor moved for sanctions based
on the alleged destruction of electronic evidence. 106 Nucor alleged that evidence
on Bell's SeverCorr laptop was destroyed, as was evidence on a thumb drive that
Bell used for work. 10 Judge David C. Norton found that Bell had a duty to
preserve the evidence on the thumb drive because he knew litigation was
imminent and found that Bell destroyed it "intentionally ... in bad faith" and
"precisely because he anticipated litigation."s08 Judge Norton also found that
Bell spoliated evidence on the laptop through its continued use.109 Based on this
spoliation, Judge Norton decided to give an adverse inference instruction
because it would "adequately sanction the improper conduct and level the
evidentiary playing field." 10
The second example is Pace v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., in
which the defendant railroad company moved for a new trial, claiming that the
district court erred in giving an adverse inference instruction based on its
negligent spoliation.
Pace, a former conductor, sued under the Federal

104. 251 F.R.D. 191 (D.S.C. 2008).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id at 193-94.
108. Id at 195-96. Note that although the Fourth Circuit falls in the middle of the spectrum of
mental culpability, Judge Norton in Nucor Corp. emphasized the intentional acts of the spoliator.
Id.
109. Id at 199. Nucor also alleged that Bell destroyed evidence by wiping data off the laptop
and having a hard drive failure, but the district court found that Nucor did not present sufficient
evidence to support these allegations. Id. at 200. Additionally, Nucor claimed that Bell improperly
failed to preserve a CD, but the district court likewise found that Nucor had not presented sufficient
evidence to support this allegation. Id at 200-01.
110. Id. at 202. Judge Norton reasoned that the adverse inference instruction was more
appropriate than granting default judgment, which would have been too harsh. Id. at 201. For
further discussion of the spoliation and associated sanctions in Nucor Corp.. see Norton et al., supra
note 5. at 470-76.
Ill. 291 F. Supp. 2d 93 (D. Conn. 2003).
112. Id. at 96. 99.
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Employers' Liability Act1 ' after he suffered a back injury allegedly caused by
improperly maintained railroad equipment.114 During litigation, the railroad
company failed to produce maintenance and inspection reports, claiming that the
documents were destroyed pursuant to its document-retention policy, but the
court noted that the company knew that litigation was imminent at the time the
documents would have been destroyed under that policy. 1
The railroad
company argued that the negligence standard for spoliation only applied after
litigation had begun, but the court rejected the argument.116 Relying on
Residential Funding Corp., the court held that the Second Circuit's adoption of
the negligence standard "appl[ied] to document destruction generally," not just
documents destroyed after litigation had begun.
In this case, the court
reasoned, litigation was reasonably foreseeable when the documents were
destroyed, and the rationale that the risk of loss "should fall on the party
responsible" for the loss applied to these facts.118

IV. THE NEED FOR A BAD FAITH MENTAL-CULPABILITY

REQUIREMENT

The circuit split over the mental-culpability requirement is clear, as is the
trend in legal scholarship tow ard allowing negligent spoliation to support an
adverse inference instruction. 120 This Part challenges this trend by showing why
negligence fails both to allow a meaningful inference to be drawn and to serve
the three purposes of the instruction. Part IV.A explains how the very inference
on which the adverse inference instruction is based requires bad faith spoliation
for the jury to draw the inference. Part IV.B then demonstrates how the three
purposes of the adverse inference instruction-to punish, deter, and remedy-are
best fulfilled by a mental-culpability requirement of bad faith.
A.

Connecting the Dots and AMfaking the Inference

Fundamentally, the adverse inference instruction allows just that-an
inference.121 The instruction is based on the "common sense observation" that a
party who destroys evidence is "more likely to have been threatened" by that

113. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2006).
114. Pace, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 96.
115. Id. at 97-98.
116. Id at 99.
117. Id
118. Id. (quoting Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir.
2002)).
119. See supra Part III.A.
120. See supra Part III.A.3.
121. See Adams, supra note 28, at 7 n.30 ("An inference is a deduction based on logic and
experience , but a presumption is a rule of law.").
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evidence than a party in the same position who did not destroy the evidence.122
Given that this is the inference that the court allows the jury to draw when the
court gives the instruction, the critical issue is ensuring that the spoliator's
actions can support this inference. This issue is so critical because the adverse
inference instruction has such a powerful effect on litigation.123 As Judge
Scheindlin wrote in Zubulake I:
In practice, an adverse inference instruction often ends litigation-it is
too difficult a hurdle for the spoliator to overcome. The in terrorem
effect of an adverse inference is obvious. When a jury is instructed that
it may "infer that the party who destroyed potentially relevant evidence
did so 'out of a realization that the [evidence was] unfavorable,"' the
party suffering this instruction will be hard-pressed to prevail on the
merits. Accordingly, the adverse inference instruction is an extreme
sanction and should not be given lightly.124
When a spoliator destroys evidence with bad faith, the inference is easy to
draw. In bad faith cases, the spoliator knows litigation is pending and makes a
conscious, deliberate decision to destroy certain evidence. That decision is made
presumably because the evidence is harmful to the spoliator's case and the
spoliator does not want that evidence to come before the jury.
This is the
crucial part of the inference: that the evidence that was destroyed because it was
unfavorable to the spoliator.126

122. Nation-Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distribs., Inc., 692 F.2d 214, 218 (Ist Cir.
1982).
123. See, e.g., Zubulake II, 220 F.R.D. 212. 219-20 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("[T]he adverse
inference instruction is an extreme sanction and should not be given lightly.").
124. Id. at 219-20 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted); see also Morris v. Union Pac.
R.R., 373 F.3d 896. 900 (8th Cir. 2004) ("An adverse inference instruction is a powerful tool in a
jury trial.").
That this instruction from a judge would be so powerful is unsurprising. See Quercia v. United
States, 289 U.S. 466, 470 (1933) ("The influence of the trial judge on the jury 'is necessarily and
properly of great weight' and 'his lightest word or intimation is received with deference, and may
prove controlling." (quoting Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 626 (1894))).
125. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson, 106 S.W.3d 718, 721 (Tex. 2003) ("[A] party who
has deliberately destroyed evidence is presumed to have done so because the evidence was
unfavorable to its case."); see also Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 334 (3d Cir.
1995) ("When the contents of a document are relevant to an issue in a case, the trier of fact
generally may receive the fact of the document's nonproduction or destruction as evidence that the
party that has prevented production did so out of the well-founded fear that the contents would harm
him." (emphasis added) (citing Gumbs v. Int'l Harvester, Inc., 718 F.2d 88, 96 (3d Cir. 1983);
United States v. Cherkasky Meat Co., 259 F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 1958))).
126. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 695 F.2d 253, 258 (7th Cir.
1982) ("The crucial element is not that the evidence was destroyed but rather the reason for the
destruction."); Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 526 (D. Md. 2010) ("[A]n
adverse inference instruction makes little logical sense if given as a sanction for negligent breach of
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Inferring that the evidence was unfavorable is easy because the spoliator
knew what it was doing-it knew that it was destroying relevant evidence, and it
was doing it for the purpose of keeping the evidence away from the jury. The
most logical reason for destroying the evidence is that the evidence was going to
hurt its case. Thus, the inference is justified.12
In Nucor Corp. v. Bell, the jury could readily draw this adverse inference
because Bell destroyed evidence on the thumb drive in bad faith.1 8 The court
explicitly noted that this evidence was not lost "negligently ... [or]
spontaneously."
Because Bell acted in bad faith, the necessary connection
between why the evidence was destroyed and its impact on Bell's case was
present, thus allowing the jury to infer that the destroyed evidence was harmful
to Bell and helpful to Nucor.
In cases in which the spoliator's actions are merely negligent, however, the
inference is far weaker, if it exists at all. A party who only negligently destroys
evidence does not demonstrate a conscious decision to keep evidence away from
the jury because the evidence was harmful to its case.'13 Without a deliberate act
expressing a "desire to suppress the truth,"1 determining that the destroyed
evidence was harmful to the spoliator is incredibly difficult, if not impossible.13 3
'3

the duty to preserve, because the inference that a party failed to preserve evidence because it
).
believed that the evidence was harmful to its case does not flow from mere negligence .
127. Proving bad faith may not always be easy, but a party seeking an adverse inference
instruction can prove that the spoliator acted with this level of culpability through a variety of
means. See Morris, 373 F.3d at 901 ("Intent rarely is proved by direct evidence, and a district court
has substantial leeway to determine intent through consideration of circumstantial evidence, witness
credibility. motives of the witnesses in a particular case, and other factors.").
128. Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 251 F.R.D. 191, 196 (D.S.C. 2008). Bell also destroyed evidence on
a laptop computer; the court found this destruction was intentional, but did not rise to the level of
bad faith. Id. at 198-99.
129. Id. at 196.
130. As Judge Norton noted, a district court must act as the initial fact finder on spoliation in
deciding whether to impose a discovery sanction such as the adverse inference instruction. Id. at
202. Then, the jury may act as an additional fact finder, in which role the jury may reject the
court's finding that spoliation actually occurred. Id. at 202-03. As long as the adverse inference
instruction is permissive rather than mandatory, such a situation with dual fact finders is
unavoidable.
Using a mandatory rather than a permissive, instruction has much in favor for it. See Norton
et al., supra note 5, at 487-93 (arguing that a mandatory instruction is preferable because it removes
duplicative factfinding and prevents the jury from disregarding the instruction). Given the impact
of the adverse inference instruction on litigation, see supra note 124 and accompanying text,
however, ensuring that the instruction is imposed only when a spoliator acts with bad faith is even
more important if the instruction is mandatory.
131. See Vick v. Tex. Emp't Comm',ii 514 F.2d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1975) ("Mere negligence is
not enough, for it does not sustain ain inference of consciousness of a weak case." (citations
omitted)).
132. Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R., 354 F.3d 739, 746 (8th Cir. 2004).
133. See, e.g., United States v. Laurent. 607 F.3d 895, 902 (1st Cir. 2010) ("In general, the
instruction usually makes sense only where the evidence permits a finding of bad faith destruction;
ordinarily, negligent destruction would not support the logical inference that the evidence was
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Thus, the inference that evidence was destroyed because it was damaging to the
spoliator's case is lacking. Because this critical connection cannot be made, the
adverse inference instruction is inappropriate when the destruction of evidence is
the result of negligence.
The most plausible, but ultimately unpersuasive, argument for giving the
instruction based on negligence comes from then-Judge Stephen Breyer's
decision in Nation-Wide Check Corp., Inc. v. Forest Hills Distributors,Inc.1 4
The argument is as follows: the "abandonment of potentially useful evidence is,
at a minimum, an indication that [the spoliator] believed the records would not
help his side of the case." 1
Essentially, this argument contends that if the
evidence were helpful to the spoliator, he would have consciously preserved it
for trial: that the spoliator did not preserve the evidence suggests that the
evidence was not helpful.
Yet not helpfidi is not the equivalent of harmfil; just because the evidence
was not going to help the spoliator's case does not mean that the evidence was
going to hurt the spoliator's case. The Southern District of New York
acknowledged that "[bjccause we do not Inow what has been destroyed, it is
impossible to accurately assess what harm has been done to the [innocent party]
and what prejudice it ias suffered ";' further, "[such documents may have

been heIpful to the [defendants], helpful to plaintiffs, or of no value to any
party."" Thus, without a tighter nexus suggesting that the destroyed evidence
was harmful to the spoliator's case, a court should not give an adverse inference
instruction when a spoliator's destruction of evidence is merely negligent.
Finally, allowing a spoliator's negligence to support the instruction is saved
neither by the permissive, rather than mandatory, nature of the instruction nor by
the ability of the jury to decide either that destroyed evidence was irrelevant or

favorable to the defendant." (citing SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL

§ 75.01 at 75-17 (2010) (instruction 75-7))); Henning v. Union Pac. R.R., 530 F.3d 1206. 1220
(10th Cir. 2008) ("Mere negligence in losing or destroying records is not enough because it does not
support an inference of consciousness of a weak case." (quoting Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d
1398, 1407 (10th Cir. 1997))).
134. 692 F.2d 214 (1st Cir. 1982). Recall that Nation-Wide did not address the mental
culpability required for the instruction to be given. See id. at 217 20; see also supra note 98.
Nevertheless, then-Judge Breyer's argument clearly applies in the context of negligent spoliation.
135. Nation-Wide. 692 F.2d at 219.
136. Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 685 F.
Supp. 2d 456, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Phillip Morris
USA Inc., 327 F. Supp. 2d 21, 25 (D.D.C. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
137. Id.
138. Although the court may know in some cases what evidence-i.e., what documents or
records were destroyed, the court remains unaware of what that evidence actually stated. If the
court were aware, an adverse inference instruction would be unnecessary because the evidence
could be presented to the jury, even if not in its original form. Thus, the Southern District of New
York's reasoning applies even if a court knows which documents were lost. See also inia notes
199 200 and accompanying text.
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that no spoliation even occurred. 139 If no logical connection exists between the
destroyed evidence and the fact that the evidence was harmful to the spoliator's
case, the jury should not be given the opportunity to conclude that the connection
did, in fact, exist. 140
Recall that in Pace, the adverse inference instruction was based on the
railroad company's negligent destruction of evidence when it failed to preserve
documents despite foreseeable litigation.
The district court never found that
the railroad company acted in bad faith. 14 In fact, the railroad company's
negligent destruction of documents gave no indication that those documents
were destroyed to hide anything. 14 Allowing the jury to draw an inference that
the documents were harmful to the railroad company was therefore a mistake.
Although the debate over the adverse inference instruction often focuses on
bad faith and negligence, two remaining levels of culpability merit some
discussion: destruction by willful act and by gross negligence.144 The inference
may be stronger with these levels of culpability, but they should still be
insufficient to justify an adverse inference instruction. Gross negligence, like
negligence, fails to allow the jury to make a sufficient connection between the
evidence that was destroyed and the fact that the evidence was harmful to the
spoliator. Courts have tried to justify the gross negligence standard by requiring
a greater showing of relevance,
but this justification fails.
Most

139. See Panel Discussion, Sanctions in Electronic Discoveiy Cases: Views from the Judges,
78 FORDHAv L. REv. I, 10 (2009) [hereinafter Fordham Panel Discussion] (remarks of Judge Shira
A. Scheindlin) ("[W]hen a court issues an adverse inference instruction, the court's finding of
spoliation can be second-guessed by the jury. Although the cowl has already found that a party
caused evidence to be lost and that a sanction is appropriate, the jury has to do it all over again.").
140. This raises the question of why a court should not allow a jury to determine whether
spoliation occurred in the first instance, even if the court instructs the jury that they may draw an
inference only if it finds bad faith spoliation. Although juries are given great deference as finders of
fact, see, e.g., Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 76 (1985) (discussing the
degree of deference given to the fact finder), judges must make some initial factual decisions before
the jury is given the opportunity to make its own findings in a case. Typically, such initial decisions
are made before a jury is empanelled or involve a question that cannot be entrusted to a jury because
knowledge of the facts, even if ultimately never to be admitted into evidence at trial, could be so
prejudicial to a party. See, e.g.. United States v. Gray. 491 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 2007) (reviewing
a district court's decision to admit evidence based on the district court's findings of fact in a
suppression hearing). An adverse inference has a great impact on a case. See supra note 124. The
risk that the jury will draw the inference when it is unwarranted is too severe to allow the jury to
make initial decisions about whether the inference should be in play. Cf Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147-49 (1999) (discussing the gatekeeping function of district courts in
the context of expert testimony). Thus, district courts must serve as gatekeepers in this context as

well.
141. Pace v. Nat'1 R.R. Passenger Corp., 291 F. Supp. 2d 93, 97-98 (D. Conn. 2003).
142. See id. at 99.
143. See id. at 97-99.
144. See 126 AM. JULR. 3DProofofFacts§4 (2012).
145. See, e.g., Klezmer ex rel. Desyatnik v. Buynak, 227 F.R.D. 43, 50 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Ifa
court finds bad faith or gross negligence, the bad faith (always) and the gross negligence (usually)
can support a finding that the destroyed or lost evidence was relevant to the claims of the party
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fundamentally, this standard still leaves the court and jury unable to "krov what
has been destroyed."146 Without know ing the conttents of what has b0eer
destroyed, the Jury cannot determine whether the spoliator destroyed the
evidence to hidc s;omthing harmful.
Just because the destroyed evidence can
be pro-ven rele-vant does not mean that the evidence was harmf 1 14 sAs
w ith the
negligent spoliator, the iur, still does not l<now why the evidence was destroyed,
and thus the iury cannot logically conclude that the grossly negligcnt spoliator
destroyed evidence in order to keep it from the jury. The adv erse inference is
thus inappropriate when a spoliator destroys evidence in a gossly negligent
manner,
Likewise, a willful act should be insufficient to support an adverse inference
instruction. With a willful act, done without bad faith,149 the jury may see a
more plausible connection between the destruction of evidence and the fact that
the evidence was harmful to the spoliator's case. Here again, the crucial factthat the evidence was destroyed because it was harmful-is missing. Of course,
the knowledgeable destruction of evidence supports a stronger inference that the
evidence was not helpful, and in fact might have been harmful. Yet a far more
tenuous inference is required than when the evidence is destroyed in bad faith
because the jury lacks the strong notion of why the evidence was destroyed.
Therefore, a willful act by a spoliator should still be insufficient for a court to
give an adverse inference instruction.150
To illustrate why only bad faith spoliation justifies an adverse inference
instruction, consider three variations of a hypothetical: a fire destroys a room in
an office building that stores a company's records, and the company is engaged

seeking it." (citing Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir.
2002)); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake Ill), 229 F.R.D. 422. 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
("[T]he concept of 'relevance' encompasses not only the ordinary meaning of the term, but also that
the destroyed evidence would have been favorable to the movant. 'This corroboration requirement
is even more necessary where the destruction was merely negligent, since in those cases it cannot be
inferred from the conduct of the spoliator that the evidence would even have been harmful to him.'
This is equally tmue in cases of gross negligence or recklessness . . . ." (footnotes omitted) (quoting
Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1991))).
146. Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Bane of Am. Sec., LLC, 685 F.
Supp. 2d 456, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting United States v. Phillip Morris USA Inc., 327 F. Supp.
2d 21, 25 (D.D.C. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
147. See id.
148. If the nonspoliating party could prove what the evidence was, rather than just that it was
relevant, the nonspoliating party would not need the adverse inference instniction because that party
would have the evidence to show to the jury.
149. Recall that the Third and Fourth Circuits adhere to this level of mental culpability. See
supra Part III.A.2.
150. Some scholars support allowing willfulness to support the instniction. See, e.g., Adams,
supra note 28, at 58 ("[T]here is no logical basis for a jury to draw an adverse inference from
spoliation unless the spoliator acted willfully or in bad faith."). Although Professor Adams
recognizes the logical connection necessary for the instruction, he believes-understandably,
although unconvincingly that willfulness provides this connection in the same manner as bad
faith. See id.
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in litigation in which some of those records are relevant. In the first variation,
the manager, knowing about the litigation, strikes a match, lights a fire, and
burns the records. This is undoubtedly bad faith, and inferring that this manager
was trying to prevent something in those records from being disclosed is easy.
In the second variation, the manager is told that the wiring in his building is
faulty and should be replaced, but because either he was too busy to address the
problem or he did not want to spend the money to fix it, the manager does not
replace the wiring. Eventually, the wires cause a fire. and the records burn. The
manager was certainly negligent in not fixing the wiring, but his negligence does
not support a conclusion that he was trying to hide something in the records.
In the third variation, the manager sneaks into the room with the records to
smoke a cigarette, lights a match, and then drops the match in a trashcan full of
paper, an act that is at least grossly negligent if not willful. Again, a fire breaks
out and burns the relevant records. Here, the manager is more at fault than in the
second variation, but connecting his action with a desire to destroy those
documents is still difficult.
Ultimately, only the first variation of this hypothetical fairly allows a jury to
conclude that the spoliator was trying to prevent evidence from coming to light.
The second and third variations simply do not support such an inference.
This Section has shown that only bad faith destruction of evidence logically
supports giving an adverse inference instruction. Without this bad faith act by
the spoliator, the inference that the destroyed evidence was harmful to the
spoliator's case is lacking. Bad faith provides this crucial connection between
the destroyed evidence and the inference that the evidence was damaging to the
spoliator's case.
B. Furthering the Three Purposes of the Adverse Inference Instruction
The adverse inference instruction serves three purposes: to punish, deter, and
remedy.152 The best use of the instruction will serve all three of the goals and
not elevate one goal above the others. Ultimately, requiring a spoliator to act in
bad faith best serves all three purposes of the instruction.
1. The Punishment Goal
The punishment goal of the instruction is simple: the spoliator must suffer
for its act that harmed the opposing party.
As Professor McCormick puts it,

15 1. In some cases, determining whether a spoliator acted in bad faith will be a close question.
But that should not give any pause. District courts often have to make difficult factual findings.
152. See supra notes 23 26 and accompanying text.
153. See Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("[The
instruction] serves as retribution against the immediate wrongdoer. [T]he law, in hatred of the
spoiler, baffles the destroyer, and thwarts his iniquitous purpose, by indulging a presumption which
supplies the lost proof, and thus defeats the wrongdoer by the very means he had so confidentially
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"The real underpinning of the rule of admissibility may be a desire to impose
swift punishment, with a certain poetic justice, rather than concern over niceties
of proof."14 This sense of punishment is rooted in just deserts, the idea that
"wrongdoing deserves punishment."1
This goal of punishment, however, is not unbounded. Just as in criminal
law, the "notion that the punishment should fit the crime"l56 applies to spoliation
sanctions.
In the context of spoliation sanctions, the First Circuit colorfully
made this point: "[T]he judge should take pains neither to use an elephant gun to
slay a mouse nor to wield a cardboard sword if a dragon looms. Whether
deterrence or compensation is the goal, the punishment should be reasonably
suited to the crime." 1 5 8 After all, the more culpable the spoliator, the more
deserving of punishment it should be. To determine the spoliator's fault and thus
how deserving it is of punishment, the "ultimate focus" is the spoliator's mental
culpability. 159 Thus, greater mental culpability merits greater punishment.
To determine what level of mental culpability deserves an adverse inference
instruction, one must first have an appreciation for how severe a punishment an
adverse inference instruction is. In Zubulake II, Judge Scheindlin called the
adverse inference instruction "an extreme sanction [that] should not be given
lightly."1 60 Judge Scheindlin has also noted that the instruction makes it hardif not impossible-for the party against whom the instruction is given to prevail
on the merits.16 1 The Tenth Circuit has taken a similar view of the instruction,
writing:
An adverse inference is a powerful sanction as it "brands one party
as a bad actor" and "necessarily opens the door to a certain degree of
speculation by the jury, which is admonished that it may infer the

employed to perpetrate the wrong." (second alteration in original) (quoting Pomeroy v. Benton, 77
Mo. 64, 86 (1882)).
154. 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 265, at 228 (Kenneth S. Brown ed., 6th ed. 2006).
155. Owen McLeod. Desert. THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PILOSOPHY (Edward N.
Zalta ed., Winter ed. 2008), http://plato.stanford.edu.archives/'win2008/entries/desert/.
156. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. I1, 31 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring).
157. Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598. 618 (S.D. Tex. 2010)
("Courts also agree that the severity of a sanction for failing to preserve when a duty to do so has
arisen must be proportionate to the culpability involved and the prejudice that results.").
158. Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 900 F.2d 388, 395 (1st Cir. 1990).
159. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Wade, 485 F.3d 1032, 1035 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Morris v.
Union Pac. R.R., 373 F.3d 896, 901 (8th Cir. 2004)).
160. 220 F.R.D. 212, 220 (S.D.N.Y.2003).
161. Id: see also Fordham Panel Discussion, supra note 139, at 6-8 (remarks of Judge Shira
A. Scheindlin) (explaining that "a]dverse inference instructions have a strong tendency to affect the
outcome of the trial" and "can have a devastating impact on the party against whom the inference is
drawn").

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

25

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 7
706

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 64: 681

presence of damaging information in the unknown contents of an erased
audiotape."1 62
These statements recognize just how incredibly harsh the adverse inference
instruction is. That other harsher sanctions-such as dismissal6
exist does
not mean that the adverse inference instruction is not a severe sanction. For
example, dismissing a case officially ends the litigation, but the adverse
inference instruction effectively does the same thing.
Similarly, that the jury
may refuse to draw the inference does not undercut the severity of the
instruction.165
For a party that destroys evidence in bad faith, such a severe sanction is
appropriate. That party has deliberately tried to subvert the judicial process, and
punishment should be harsh and swift. But for a party who only negligently
destroys evidence, the punishment should be less severe.
The negligent
spoliator, of course, deserves some punishment; costs for trying to recover
destroyed evidence and fines are reasonable and proportionate punishments for
the negligent spoliator.166 The negligent spoliator does not, however, deserve a
litigation-ending sanction. The spoliator's conduct, although culpable, was not
terribly bad.167 Additionally, courts have a preference for deciding cases on their
merits, 68 which adverse inference instructions undermine.
Rather than focusing explicitly on the punitive rationale, arguments favoring
the allowance of negligent spoliation in support of an adverse inference
instruction typically take either of two approaches: First, they deemphasize the

162. Henning v. Union Pac. R.R.. 530 F.3d 1206. 1219-20 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Morris,
373 F.3d at 900-01: see also Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 251 F.R.D. 191. 202 (D.S.C. 2008) (calling the
adverse inference instruction "a heavy sanction").

163. See, e.g., Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583. 585 (4th Cir. 2001) (dismissing a
case as punishment for spoliating evidence).
164. See, e.g., Zubulake HI,220 F.R.D. at 220 ("[T]he party suffering [an adverse inference]
instruction will be hard-pressed to prevail on the merits.").
165. Despite concerns about juries ignoring the instruction, see James T. Killelea, Note,
Spoliation of Evidence: Proposals for New York State, 70 BROOK. L. REv. 1045, 1060 & n.102,
1061 (2005) (recognizing the possibility that juries may refuse to follow an adverse inference
instruction), no evidence suggests that juries do this with any regularity.
166. See, e.g., Passlogix, Inc. v. 2FA Tech., LLC, 708 F. Supp. 2d 378. 420-23 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) (discussing remedies for negligent spoliation and imposing a fine on a negligent spoliator but
declining to impose costs due to difficulties in determining actual costs incurred).
167. Courts must use their normal factfinding means, such as briefing and hearings, to
determine the level of culpability with which a spoliator acted. If a spoliator consistently fails to
preserve evidence relevant to litigation, that pattern of destruction may well be evidence of bad
faith. Thus, while negligent spoliation itself is insufficient to warrant an adverse inference
instruction, it may be an indicator of bad faith, vhich would warrant the instruction.
168. See, e.g., Eitel v. McCool. 782 F.2d 1470. 1472 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Pena v. Seguros
La Comercial, S.A., 770 F.2d 811 , 814 (9th Cir. 1985)) ("Cases should be decided upon their merits
whenever reasonably possible.").
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role of punishment in the instruction.169 Alternatively, they fold the punitive
rationale into the instruction's deterrence aim.170
Both of these approaches are misguided. Those seeking to remove or
diminish the punitive rationale blatantly ignore a fundamental aspect of the
adverse inference instruction. Courts have repeatedly recognized that the
instruction should punish the spoliator in that case, not just deter future
spoliation.1
By removing punishment as a rationale for the instruction, the
instruction becomes less of a scalpel for courts to manage a particular case and
more of a blunt tool for broadly affecting the behavior of all litigants. The
instruction, from its earliest days, focused on the parties in a particular case.
Therefore, ignoring the punitive rationale untethers the instruction from its
moorings.
Those who seek to combine the punitive and deterrence rationales are on
more solid ground with the instruction's historical underpinnings,1 but this
approach runs the risk of overpunishing spoliators.
If courts consider
punishment and deterrence together, they are far more likely to issue harsher
punishments because of the deterrent effect that a particularly harsh punishment
has on potential wrongdoers. The punishment would no longer fit the crime, and
the spoliator's punishment would be disproportionate to its offense.
The best way to ensure that the spoliator's punishment comports with its
culpability is to treat the punishment rationale as focused on just deserts. For

169. See Judge, supra note 101, at 463-64 (recommending that the adverse inference
instruction be "extended to negligent spoliation of evidence, and that its use as a punishment device
be curtailed").
170. See Adams, supra note 28, at 17 ("Punishing the negligent spoliation of evidence deters
spoliation by imposing the consequence of the spoliation on the spoliator, who would generally be
the cheapest cost avoider.").
Some cowls also combine the punishment and deterrence rationale. See, e.g., Shamis v.
Ambassador Factors Corp., 34 F. Supp. 2d 879, 890 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("The punitive purpose both
deters parties from destruction of relevant evidence and directly punishes the party responsible for
spoilation [sic]."). The better-and more common-view is to treat deterrence and punishment as
separate rationales. See Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he
applicable sanction should be molded to serve the prophylactic, punitive, and remedial rationales
underlying the spoliation doctrine." (quoting West v. Goodyear lire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776,
779 (2d Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Treating punishment and deterrence as
separate rationales also provides support for treating the punishment rationale as focused on just
deserts because deterrence, another purpose of punishment, is treated as a distinct rationale for the
adverse inference instruction.
171. See, e.g., Clark Constr. Grp., Inc. v. City of Memphis, 229 F.R.D. 131, 141 (W.D. Tenn.
2005) (noting that the court should "punish the spoliating party for its actions" (emphasis added)).
172. See, e.g., The Pizarro, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 227, 240 (1817) (focusing on the litigants in
that case in determining that the instruction was not appropriate): Annory v. Delamirie, (1722) 93
Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B.); I Strange, 506 (focusing on the goldsmith's conduct in determining that the
instruction was warranted).
173. See Nation-Wide Check Corp., Inc. v. Forest Hills Distribs., Inc., 692 F.2d 214, 218 (1st
Cir. 1982) (treating the "prophylactic and punitive effects" of the instruction as part of the same
rationale); cf. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008) (citing, in a criminal case, deterrence
as a rationale for punishment).
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example, in Nucor, Bell deserved harsh punishment for intentionally destroying
important evidence.174 Conversely, in Pace, a far less culpable mistake did not
deserve litigation-ending punishment.
Only the most culpable spoliatorsthat is, those acting in bad faith-deserve the harsh punishment of the adverse
inference instruction. By focusing on the punishment rationale to ensure that a
spoliator gets its just deserts, courts can ensure that the punishment fits the
crime.
2.

The Deterrence Goal

To have an effective adversarial system, courts must have rules that deter
misconduct and encourage parties to preserve relevant evidence.
Because
potential spoliators control the evidence, they are in the best position to preserve
that evidence.177 Thus, courts seek to deter potential spoliators from destroying
evidence and undermining the judicial process.
The adverse inference
instruction serves that prophylactic purpose-deterring the destruction of
evidence by threatening potential spoliators with severe punishment. 8 The
instruction therefore places the risk of destroyed evidence "on the party
responsible for its loss."1
Those who believe negligent spoliation should support an adverse inference
instruction look to tort law as an analogy. In Turner, the Southern District of
New York reasoned:
The adverse inference thus acts as a deterrent against even the
negligent destruction of evidence.
This is perfectly appropriate:
deterrence is not a function limited to punitive sanctions where intent
has been demonstrated. In the law of torts, for example, damages for
negligence serve to deter such conduct in the future. 80
Certainly, the adverse inference instruction can be administered in a way to
deter negligent spoliation-indeed, the law can deter any level of undesirable

174. See Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 251 F.R.D. 191, 195-99, 202 (D.S.C. 2008).
175. See Pace v. Nat'I R.R. Passenger Corp., 291 F. Supp. 2d 93, 97-99 (D. Conn. 2003).
176. See Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Nation-Wide
Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distribs., Inc., 692 F.2d 214, 218 (1st Cir. 1982)).
177. See Adams, supra note 28, at 17 ("The spoliator usually has access to the evidence and
can prevent its spoliation .... ).
178. See Nation-Wide, 692 F.2d at 218.
179. Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir. 2002)
(quoting Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc.. 142 F.R.D. 68, 75 (S.D.N.Y 1991)); see also Laurie
S. Longinotti, Comment, Evidence Welsh v. United States: Negligent Spoliation ofEvidence: The
Creation of a Rebuttable Presumption, 19 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 229 233 (1989) (citing NationWide, 692 F.2d at 218) (observing that the deterrence rationale "attempts to deter a party from
destroying relevant evidence prior to trial by placing the risk of destruction upon that party").
180. Turner. 142 F.R.D. at 75 n.3.
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conduct.181 For proponents of allowing negligent spoliation to justify the
instruction, placing the burden to preserve evidence on the party in control of the
evidence-and thus placing the risk of loss with this party-is paramount.1
Admittedly, the party in control of evidence should bear both the duty to
preserve and the risk of loss of that evidence. That proposition seems
uncontestable. But myopically focusing on deterrence is too narrow, as looking
in a vacuum at how the adverse inference can deter spoliation misses the broader
purpose of the instruction. The instruction is part of the judge's toolbox for
managing litigation.
It is designed to help resolve disputes, but other
considerations are also involved in how best to resolve disputes. Litigation seeks
to discover the truth and resolve disputes fairly.183 These truth-seeking and
dispute-resolution functions-not the preservation of evidence-are most
important.1
Evidence therefore should be preserved because it leads to the
truth and fair resolution of disputes, not because of some inherent value in
preserving it. In this sense, using the adverse inference instruction-or, for that
matter, any and all discovery sanctions-to deter spoliation is useful because it
increases the odds that evidence is preserved for trial.
That desire to preserve evidence for trial, however, must be balanced with
the costs of deterrence and the larger goals of litivation. Litigation, particularly
discovery, is an incredibly expensive endeavor,' and the Supreme Court has
shown acute concern for this expense.
The benefits and costs of discovery
must be balanced to allow parties access to the relevant evidence without
imposing burdens that drive the cost of the discovery beyond the value of the

181. Cf Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009) (observing that the Fourth
Amendment's exclusionary rule is designed "to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent
conduct" by police).
182. See Creative Res. Grp. of N.J., Inc. v. Creative Res. Grp., Inc., 212 F.R.D. 94. 107
(E.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing Residential Funding, 306 F.3d at 108).
183. See United States v. Harper, 662 F.3d 958. 961 (7th Cir. 2011) (commenting that "trials
are searches for truth").
184. See Adams, supra note 28, at 17 ("If the goal of the litigation process is simply to achieve
the optimal level of preservation of evidence, allocating the cost of spoliation onto the spoliator
through an adverse inference instruction could well be appropriate. But the goal of litigation should
be ascertaining the true facts in the case, not efficiently preserving evidence."); Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Determination of Liabilitv, 37 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (1994) ("The
degree of accuracy is a central concern of adjudication.").
185. See generally Conference Report, Lawyers for Civil Justice et al., Litigation Cost Survey
of Major Companies 2-7 (May 10-11, 2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts-/RulesAindPolicies/
rules/Duke%/o20Materials/Library/Litigation 0OCost%/o20Surveyo200f% 2OMajor 0 OCompanies.pdf
(summarizing the key findings of a survey regarding the costs of litigation to major companies
across the United States).
186. See Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557-60 (2007) (citing Dura Pharm., Inc.
v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005); Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State
Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 528 n1.17 (1983); 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER. FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1216, at 233-34 (3d ed. 2004)) (showing
particular concern for the costs of discovery in evaluating the standard that a complaint must meet
to survive a motion to dismiss).
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litigation.187 If negligent spoliation can support an adverse inference instruction,
litigants will be forced to greater extremes to preserve any evidence that may be
relevant to the litigation, which will undoubtedly increase expenses. This
increased cost will be particularly applicable to organizational litigants
consisting of multiple individuals accessing electronically stored information.
Although a technical cost-benefit analysis would be difficult, if not impossible,
to complete, these costs are significant. Yet the benefits of preserving evidence
are significant, particularly to the party who suffers the harm of losing that
evidence. Still, despite the natural desire to ensure that a party gets the chance to
put on its evidence at trial, that desire should not lead to a policy creating such
an overwhelming deterrence that the deterrence has greater compliance costs
than evidentiary benefits."'
Requiring a spoliator act in bad faith before giving an adverse inference
instruction still acts as a deterrent.
The instruction provides a clear
punishment-and a severe one-for the spoliator who acts in bad faith. This bad
faith is not limited to actually destroying evidence after litigation arises; it also
extends to bad faith decisions to never preserve evidence in the first place. For
example, in Lewry v. Remington 4rms Co.,189 the Eighth Circuit noted that a
document-retention policy could be instituted in bad faith, if that policy were
designed to ensure that potentially damaging documents never were preserved.' 0
The adverse inference instruction thus deters litigants from engaging in such
behavior and encourages them to act in good faith.
Of course, willful or grossly negligent acts still remain. If deterring simple
negligence is too costly but bad faith can still be deterred by the instruction, then
the instruction may also deter willful and grossly negligent acts. Thus, a
decision must be made about the extent to which courts should deter potential
spoliation. In the context of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has
drawn the line between negligence and gross negligence: grossly negligent-or
more culpable-police acts result in the exclusion of evidence, but merely
negligent acts do not.'
Although this exclusionary rule standard may suggest
that the line be drawn in the same place for the adverse inference instruction, the

187. See Regan-Touhy v. Walgreen Co., 526 F.3d 641, 649 (10th Cir. 2008) ("[T]he burdens
and costs associated with electronic discovery. such as those seeking 'all email,' are by now well
known, and district courts are properly encouraged to weigh the expected benefits and burdens
posed by particular discovery requests (electronic and otherwise) to ensure that collateral discovery
disputes do not displace trial on the merits as the primary focus of the parties' attention.").
188. Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e) may not provide an excuse for negligent
spoliation, that rule does reflect the reality that preserving all electronically stored information is
virtually impossible. See FED. R. Civ. P. 3 7(e) ("Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not
impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored information
lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system.").
189. 836 F.2d 1104 (8th Cir. 1988).
190. Id. at 1112 (citing Gumbs v. Int'l Harvester, Inc., 718 F.2d 88. 96 (3d Cir. 1983)).
191. See Herring v. United States. 555 U.S. 135, 147-48 (2009) (citing United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 907 n.6 (1984)) (holding that police negligence does not trigger the exclusionary
rule).
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exclusionary rule does not compel this result. Other sanctions exist for
spoliation. For instance, the spoliator can be fined or pay costs incurred by the
other side.192 For Fourth Amendment violations, however, the exclusionary rule
is the only realistic sanction to remedy the wrong.
Furthermore, the
exclusionary rule applies in the criminal context, in which courts jealously
protect defendants' rights, whereas the adverse inference instruction applies in
the civil context, in which liberty concerns are not typically present.194
Still, the adverse inference instruction can deter grossly negligent or willful
spoliation, just as it can deter negligent spoliation. But that deterrence comes at
the same cost as deterring negligent spoliation: it leaves open the possibility that
by using such a powerful tool to deter misconduct, the litigation could be
effectively ended without reaching the truth. The instruction does, after all,
effectively end litigation. 195 Willful or grossly negligent spoliation can lead to a
sanction ending the case without sufficiently supporting the inference that the
destroyed evidence was that damaging to the spoliator's case. 196
Ultimately, the adverse inference instruction serves as a useful tool against
bad faith spoliation. That the instruction can also deter other types of spoliation
does not mean that using the instruction to deter that type of spoliation is the
correct choice. The instruction is simply a tool that the judge can use to help
reach the truth. Allowing the instruction to deter spoliation other than bad faith
spoliation risks elevating the desire to preserve evidence above the search for
truth. Hence, the instructions in both Nucor and Pace serve as warnings to
future litigants, but the instruction in Pace may overdeter litigants, forcing them
to save every document for fear of a severe sanction. 197 The instruction is
therefore best used to deter bad faith spoliation while serving the broader truthseeking goals of the judicial system.

192. See, e.g., Mosaid 1, 224 F.R.D. 595, 601 (D.N.J. 2004) (granting fees and costs as a
spoliation sanction).
193. See RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL.. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATION AND RIGHT TO
COUNSEL 352-61 (2d ed. 2011) (discussing tort damages, injunctions, criminal prosecutions, and
administrative and political remedies as alternatives to the exclusionary rule, and noting that these
options are far less common remedies for Fourth Amendment violations).
194. In some civil cases, such as habeas cases, liberty interests are at stake. See, e.g., 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) (providing procedures for habeas petitions in federal courts for a prisoner in a
state's custody): id. § 2255 (providing procedures for habeas petitions in federal courts for a
prisoner in federal custody). Yet civil cases with such liberty interests are not the norm.
195. See, e.g., Zubulake II, 220 F.R.D. 212, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("In practice, an adverse
inference instruction often ends litigation-it is too difficult a hurdle for the spoliator to
overcome.").
196. See supra notes 145-50 and accompanying text.
197. See Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 251 F.R.D. 191, 197 99, 203-04 (D.S.C. 2008); Pace v. Nat'1

R.R. Passenger Corp., 291 F. Supp. 2d 93, 97-99 (D. Conn. 2003).
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The Remedial Goal

The adverse inference instruction's third goal is to provide a remedy for the
injured party who was denied the advantage of useful evidence. The instruction
should "place the non-spoliating part in the position it should have been in" if
the evidence had not been destroyed.s
When the spoliator acts with bad faith and the inference that the instruction
allows the jury to draw is supported by the facts, the adverse inference
instruction serves this remedial purpose nicely. The prejudiced party gets the
benefit of the destroyed evidence because the jury knows the type of evidence
that was destroyed and presumes that the evidence was harmful to the spoliator.
When the spoliator acts with less than bad faith, however, the instruction no
longer serves its remedial purpose and "goes beyond making [the] plaintiff
whole."l9 9 Recall why negligent, grossly negligent, and willful spoliation do not
logically support the inference: these levels of culpability do not sufficiently
connect the destroyed evidence to the fact that the evidence was harmful to the
spoliator.200 Without this connection, giving the adverse inference instruction
when the spoliator acts with less than bad faith does not make the nonspoliating
party whole.
Rather, it gives the nonspoliating party a windfall: the
nonspoliating party gets the benefits of the instruction without showing that the
instruction is actually warranted by the connection of the destroyed evidence to
the fact that the evidence was harmful to the spoliator's case. Like other areas of
the law that reject remedies that do more than make the plaintiff whole,201
spoliation sanctions should similarly reject such remedies.
Proponents of allowing a spoliator's negligence to support the instruction
have two arguments that the remedial purpose is served when negligent
spoliation results in an adverse inference instruction, but these are arguments are
ultimately unpersuasive. First, they point to the corroboration requirement. In
Turner, the Southern District of New York wrote:

198. Clark Constr. Grp., Inc. v. City of Memphis, 229 F.R.D. 131, 141 (W.D. Tenn. 2005); see
also Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 618 (S.D. Tex. 2010) ("A
measure of the appropriateness of a sanction is whether it 'restore[s] the prejudiced party to the
same position he would have been in absent the wrongful destruction of evidence by the opposing
party.'" (alteration in original) (quoting West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779
(2d Cir. 1999))).
199. Mosaid L 224 F.R.D. 595, 600 (D.N.J. 2004). In Afosiad I, the court was worried that
giving the instruction "would elevate [the evidence] to ain arguably unjustified level of importance
and create a potentially insurmountable hurdle for defendants." Id.
200. See supra Part IV.A.
201. Most notably, contract law prohibits a recovery that puts a party "in a better position than
Ostano
[the party] would have been in had the contract been satisfactorily performed."
Commerzanstalt v. Telewide Sys., Inc., 880 F.2d 642, 649 (2d Cir. 1989).
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[S]ome extrinsic evidence of the content of the evidence is necessary for
the trier of fact to be able to determine in what respect and to what
extent it would have been detrimental.
This corroboration requirement is even more necessary where the
destruction was merely negligent, since in those cases it cannot be
inferred from the conduct of the spoliator that the evidence would even
have been harmful to him. 202
Yet this very statement explains why the instruction is both unwarranted and
unnecessary in the case of negligent spoliation. The instruction is unwarranted
because no inference connects the "conduct of the spoliator" with the fact that
the evidence "would even have been harmful to him." 203 Thus, the very
inference that the court would be allowing the jury to draw by giving the
instruction is utterly lacking.
Next, the instruction is unnecessary because when the nonspoliating party
can offer extrinsic evidence of what the destroyed evidence was, the jury can
base its decision on that extrinsic evidence, rather than on the destroyed
evidence. The adverse inference instruction is premised on the idea that the
spoliator tried to suppress damaging evidence.204 That a jury may logically infer
something about the content of destroyed evidence from extrinsic evidence is not
the same as the adverse inference, and the judge need not give that instruction.
Jury instructions generally tell jurors to "use their general knowledge and
experience possessed in common with other people" to reach a verdict.205
Therefore, jurors do not need an adverse inference instruction because they can
use extrinsic evidence related to the destroyed evidence as an aid in interpreting
that destroyed evidence.
Second, proponents of allowing a spoliator's negligence to support the
instruction claim that if the spoliator is still allowed to present rebuttal evidence,
then the spoliator can overcome the instruction and explain why the jury should
not draw the inference. Courts that allow negligent spoliation to support the
instruction often give an irrebuttable presumption when the spoliator acts in bad
faith but only a rebuttable presumption when the spoliator is merely negligent.206

202. Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
203. See id.
204. See Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Wade, 485 F.3d 1032, 1035 (8th Cir. 2007) (stating that the
instruction is premised on preventing spoliators from 'suppress[ing] the truth" (quoting Stevenson
v. Union Pac. R.R., 354 F.3d 739, 746 (8th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
205. 75A AM. JLR. 2D Trial § 1223 (2007) (citing Commonwealth v. Jones. 683 A.2d 1181.
1196 (Pa. 1996): Hoover v. Gregory. 117 S.E.2d 395, 396 (N.C. 1960); Gillette Motor Transp. Co.
v. Whitfield, 200 S.W.2d 624, 625 (Tex. 1947); Fisher v. O'Brien, 162 P. 317, 319 (Kan. 1917)).
206. For example, the Southern District of New York described its adverse inference
instruction as follows:
In its most harsh form, when a spoliating party has acted willfully or in bad faith, a
jury can be instructed that certain facts are deemed admitted and must be accepted as
true. At the next level, when a spoliating party has acted willfully or recklessly, a court
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The rebuttable presumption, however, still leaves open the likely possibility that
the jury will draw the inference because the instruction itself, no matter how
carefully phrased,207 still labels the spoliator as a wrongdoer.208 This labeling
makes the jury far less likely to believe the spoliator's explanation of what
happened to the destroyed evidence. 209
The rebuttable presumption thus
provides little protection for the negligent spoliator from facing a severe
sanction. Instead, it provides the nonspoliating party with an unwarranted
benefit.
Returning again to Nucor Corp. and Pace, the plaintiff in -Nucor Corp.
rightly deserved the benefit of the adverse inference instruction after Bell
deliberately destroyed evidence that would have proven the plaintiffs case.210
By contrast, in Pace, the plaintiff received a windfall when the court gave the
instruction because the plaintiff had never shown any strong connection that
suggested the lost documents were harmful to the railroad company's case.
These two cases illustrate why bad faith is necessary for the adverse inference
instruction to be given.
V.

CONCLUSION

This trend of allowing negligent spoliation to support the adverse inference
instruction ignores the inference in the adverse inference instruction: the
spoliator's bad faith provides the logical link between the destroyed evidence
and the fact that the evidence was harmful to the spoliator's case. Negligence
does not provide this connection because a negligent spoliator does not
consciously destroy evidence, thereby suggesting it was trying to hide
something. Also, this bad faith requirement serves the three purposes of the
adverse inference instruction. This requirement ensures that only the most
culpable spoliators receive this severe punishment. Next, it effectively deters
spoliation in the broader context of the judicial process. And finally, it provides
an appropriate remedy for a party who suffers the harm of bad faith spoliation

may impose a mandatory presumption. Even a mandatory presumption, however, is
considered to be rebuttable.
The least harsh instruction permits (but does not require) a jury to presume that the
lost evidence is both relevant and favorable to the innocent party. If it makes this
presumption, the spoliating party's rebuttal evidence must then be considered by the jury,
which must then decide whether to draw an adverse inference against the spoliating party.
This sanction still benefits the innocent party in that it allows thejury to consider both the
misconduct of the spoliating party as well as proof of prejudice to the innocent party.
Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456,
470-71 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (footnotes omitted).
207. Again, recall the impact ajudge's words can have on a jury. See supra note 124.
208. See Morris v. Union Pac. R.R., 373 F.3d 896. 900 (8th Cir. 2004) (observing that the
instruction "brands one party as a bad actor").
209. Id. at 899-901.
210. See Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 251 F.R.D. 191, 197-99 (D.S.C. 2008).
211. See Pace v. Nat'1I R.R. Passenger Corp., 291 F. Supp. 2d 93, 97-99 (D. Conn. 2003).
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without giving an undeserved benefit to the party who suffers the harm of merely
negligent spoliation. As more and more electronic discovery issues arise and
more and more sanctions are imposed, the importance of this mental-culpability
requirement will continue to grow. The adverse inference instruction should
therefore be reserved for cases when the spoliator acts in bad faith if it is to
remain an effective tool for combating spoliation.
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